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COMMENTARY 
THE CREATION OF A USABLE JUDICIAL 
PAST: MAX LERNER, CLASS CONFLICT, 
AND THE P ROPAGATION OF JUDICIAL 
TITANS 
SARAH BARRINGER GORDON* 
INTRODUCTION 
"Judicial titans" are made, not born. What's more, they are made 
in the interest and the reflection of their admirers. The biographer's  
art ,  as Laura Kalman points out in her Commentary, often shades p er­
ilously close to autobiography.l Biographers, especially j udicial biog­
raphers, traditionally tell success stories, harnessing themselves to the 
p ower wielded by elite men.2 The relationship is one of extreme deli­
cacy, blending often as not elements of control, rej ection, and m anipu­
lation with those of distance, admiration, and acceptance.3 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. ,  1982, Vassar College; 
J .D. ,  1986, Yale University; M.A.R. (Ethics), 1987, Yale Divinity School; Ph.D .  (History), 
1995, Princeton University. The author wishes to thank Lawrence Fleischer, Clyde 
Spil lenger, A. Leo Levin, Laura Kalman, and Matthew Adler, as well as Norman Dorsen, 
Christopher Eisgruber, and the presenters and participants in the New York University 
School of Law Conference on Judicial B iography for comments and criticisms on drafts of 
this Commentary, and James D. Todd, Jr. (J.D., 1995, University of Pennsylvania) for re­
search assistance. 
I See Laura Kalman, The Wonder of the Warren Court, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 780, 781 n.9 
(1995). 
2 For a sampling of the proliferation of recent perceptive analyses and critiques of 
biography, see Ulick O'Connor, Biographers and the Art of Biography (1993) (discussing 
creativity of many biographers and arguing biography is truly an art form); B lanche W. 
Cook, Biographer and Subject: A Critical Connection, in Between Women 397, 409 (Carol 
Ascher et al. eds., 1984) (describing her own approach to writing biographies as "aim(ing] 
to understand, to feel profoundly, to absorb the flavors as far as possible and to learn from 
[her] subjects"); Eric Hornberger & John Charmley, Introduction to The Troubled Face of 
Biography at ix (Eric Hornberger & John Charrnley eds., 1988) (describing writers of b iog­
raphies as having "personal motives" including wanting to tell interesting stories or reinter­
pret subject's life); Janet Malcolm, Annals of Biography: The Silent Woman-!, New 
Yorker, Aug. 23, 1993, at 84, 86 ("The voyeurism and busybodyism that impel writers and 
readers of biography alike are obscured by an apparatus of scholarship designed to give the 
enterprise an appearance of banklike blandness and solidity . . . .  The transgressive nature 
of biography is rarely acknowledged, but it is the only explanation for biography's status as 
a popular genre."). 
3 See Victoria Glendinning, Lies and Silences, in The Troubled Face of B iography, 
supra note 2, at 49, 54 (describing biographers' tendency to "get uniquely close to a per·· 
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Biographers of Holmes and Brandeis created j udicial titans in the 
1 930s, as Professor White details in his article.4 As a scholar who has 
devoted his professional career to biography of elite legal figures, es­
pecially Supreme Court Justices,5 White has good reason to know the 
potential,  and the pitfalls, of biography. In this article on the reputa­
tions of Holmes and Brandeis, White has gone one step further, at­
tempting the biography of biographers. As White makes clear in his 
evaluation of the quality of their work, this is a group with whose 
conclusions he often disagrees,6 and at the same time he is convinced 
he has understood and compartmentalized their motive and modus 
operandi. The results are mixed. White's research into treatments of 
Holmes and Brandeis in traditional legal literature is impressive. As a 
narrative historian, White is j ust about the best there is working on 
S upreme Court biography. His analysis of the lives and strategies of 
those who produced the reputations of Holmes and Brandeis, I argue, 
is less well-grounded. 
To probe the usefulness of the polysyllabic " epistemological mod­
ernism" label that White applies to the admirers of Holmes and 
B randeis,7 this Commentary tests his theory against the work of Max 
Lerner, one of the early !ionizers whose books and articles helped ere-
son" yet "struggle to preserve detachment"); Virginia Woolf, The Art of Biography, in The 
Death of the Moth and Other Essays 1 87 (1 942) (describing biography as craft and art 
subject to factual limitations but open to creativity and imagination). 
4 See G. Edward Whi te, The Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology 
and Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 576 (1995). 
5 For a sampling of his extensive work, see, e.g., G. Edward White, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self (1993) [hereinafter White, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes}; G. Edward White, Earl Warren: A Public Life (1982); G .  Edward 
White, The Anti-Judge: Wil l iam 0. Douglas and the Ambiguities of Individuality, 74 Va. 
L. Rev. 17 (1988); G. Edward White, Chief Justice Marshal l ,  Justice Holmes, and the Dis­
course of Constitutional Adjudication, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 131 (1988). As White 
himself has described his work, he is not " troubled" by the "el itist character of academic 
life and of l ife in general . " G. Edward White, Intervention and Detachment: Essays in 
Legal History and Jurisprudence 11 (1994) [hereinafter White, Intervention and 
Detachment}. 
6 As White puts it, " the commentators were often simply wrong in' their assessments of 
Holmes and Brandeis. " White, supra note 4, at 578. A more concrete example of White's 
disagreement with Max Lerner is found in White's own work on Holmes, which directly 
challenges Lerner's conclusion that Holmes was virtually without ambition. For instance, 
while Lerner argued that " [w}hat disappoints many about Holmes is the absence of passion 
and of a feeling of dedication, the lack of the pattern of torture and complexity such as . . .  
[recent] generations . . .  have come to expect of the modern hero," Max Lerner, The Great 
Ganglion That Was Holmes, in Nine Scorpions in a Bottle: Great Judges and Cases of the 
Supreme Court 109, 124 (Richard Cummings ed.,  1994) [hereinafter Nine Scorpions in a 
Bottle], White concludes that the essence of Holmes was his drive, his thirst for success and 
recognition. White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, supra note 5, at 476 (characterizing 
Holmes above all by "vast and driving ambi tion"). 
7 White, supra note 4, at 579 n. ll. 
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ate the reputations of the j udicial titans. I conclude that, at least as 
currently constructed,  White's modernism label does not reflect the 
nuances of liberal legal thought in the 1930s.8 
I 
LERNER, CAPITALISM, AND THE SCIENCE OF CLASS CONFLICT 
Shortly before he died, Max Lerner reflected on six decades of 
commentary on the Supreme Court.  What struck the octogenarian 
Lerner as he reread and collected his essays was not modernist episte­
mology, but the warlike tone of his commentary.9 From the moment 
his first law review article, "The Social Thought of Mr. Justice 
8 Professor White rightly acknowledges that his theory is one that simplifies (even 
"radically oversimplif[ies]") the very epistemological categories he posits. Id. The ques­
tion thus becomes at  what level simplification becomes more obfuscatory than i l luminative. 
Historians continually engage in disputes about whether a given time or p lace is  best ana­
lyzed as a cohesive whole or as fragmented parts. Those who tend toward the whole are 
called "Jumpers," while those who argue for particularity are called "splitters." One way to 
conceive of my argument in this Commentary is to point out that Professor White has 
lumped Holmes, Brandeis, and their admirers into a single category, while I am convinced 
that a more differentiated, "split" approach gives us more insight into the propagation of 
judicial titans of the 1930s, especially given that the very term "modern" is so  overused as 
to have become almost meaningless, in danger of being applied to "every idea, every arti­
fact, made since 1850." Peter Gay, Freud, Jews, and Other Germans: Masters and Victims 
in Modernist Culture 27, 26-27 (1978). 
In this Commentary, I conclude that the simplified, decontextualized label "modern­
ism" is not a particularly helpful device. This is so both because, as White correctly ac­
knowledges, he has constructed a category that as a matter of history is "overbroad ," 
White, supra note 4, at 579 n.ll, but also because "modernism" is a term generally associ­
ated with the arts-literary, visual ,  and so on-rather than with the less bohemian enter­
prise of legal analysis. The "modern" artist has typically rejected the "scientism" White 
ascribes to modernism as shallow, naive, positivistic, and empty. David A. Hol linger, The 
Knower and the Artificer, in Modernist Culture in America 47 (David J. Singal ed., 1991). 
If the modernist label (epistemological or otherwise) is to be a useful one, therefore, i t  
must  be more precisely tailored to fit  both those i t  purports to describe, and to take ac­
count of the many modernists who outright rejected the empiricism and rationality that 
White argues defines the modernism of our two judicial titans and their early admirers. 
For a recent alternative characterization of many of the same epistemological phenomena 
in legal thought as essentially "progressive," see general.\y Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Course of Progressive Legal Thought 1 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(characterizing "liberal intellectuals" who "dominated the New Deal" as p art of long pe­
riod of progressive legal thought running from turn of century to 1960). For a critique of 
the historiography of progressivism that elegantly captures the difficulties facing any histo­
rian who attempts to cabin the essence of any historical period, see Daniel T. Rodgers, In 
Search of Progressivism, Rev. Am. Hist . ,  Dec. 1982, at 113. 
9 See, e.g., Max Lerner, Preface to Nine Scorpions in a Bottle, supra note 6, at 3, 3 
[hereinafter Lerner, Preface] ("The metaphors in this . . .  batch of essays are unreservedly 
warlike."). The tit le of Lerner's book, a reference to the nine Justices of the Supreme 
Court, conveys Lerner's sense that the process of judicial decisionmaking is not character­
ized by peace and amity among judges. See also Max Lerner, Ideas Are Weapons (1939). 
This sense of combat, and of combativeness, was not unique to Lerner. See, e.g., William 
E .  Leuchtenburg, The New Deal and the Analogue of War, in Change and Continuity in 
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Brandeis , "  appeared in the Yale Law Journal in 1931,10 Lerner was 
caught up in battles-constitutional interpretation, judicial review, 
economic analysis, and democratic theory, just to name a few. His 
second article, "The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, "11 
charged the Court with being the partner-in-crime of robber b arons. 
Judicial review and capitalist business enterprise,  Lerner argued, were 
part of " an aggressive and cohesive cultural pattern," which strove " to 
drive a wedge of constitutional uniformity through heterogeneous sec­
tional and economic groupings. "12 Given the intimate relationship be­
tween the Supreme Court and capitalism, "it is no historical accident 
but a matter of cultural logic that a Field should grow where a Morgan 
does; and a Brandeis is none the less organic a product of capitalist 
society than is a Debs. "13 L erner left no doubt about which pair he 
thought was conducive to exploitation, and which was con ducive to 
what he often called "democratic collectivism. " These were the issues 
Lerner cared about passionately, that he devoted a long career in 
journalism and academics to analyzing and elucidating, and in which 
he gloried. 
Lerner was one of the most prolific and influential of the publi­
cists whose admiration (even adulation) galvanized the reputations of 
Holmes and Brandeis in the 1 930s. Editor, writer, economist,  p olitical 
scientist, one-time Yale law student, and passionate supporter of lib-
Twentieth-Century America 81 (John Braeman et al. eds., 1964) (describing uses of analo­
gies to combat in New Deal rhetoric). 
Lerner was well known among l iberals in the 1930s and 1940s, and to generations of 
New Yorkers through his columns in the New York Post. At his death in 1992, Lerner was 
the author of ten books, dozens of articles, and many hundreds of newspaper columns. 
Although an admirer recently claimed that "the wrath of Max Lerner reads like that of the 
Old Testament God of Noah 's flood," Richard Cummings, Introduction to Nine Scorpions 
in a Bottle, supra note 6, at  xv, xvii, Lerner was often more sound than fury. On my 
reading of most of his articles and several of his books, Lerner's observations were cer­
tainly keen-his ability to draw connections between different phenomena in American 
society was impressive, for example-but his scope was limited. As one reviewer put it, 
"Mr. Lerner endows the posing of his question with more audacity than he does his quest 
for the answers." C.R. Walker, 163 Atlantic Monthly 904, 904 (1939) (reviewing Max 
Lerner, It Is Later than You Think: The Need for a Militant Democracy (1938)). Lerner's 
skil l  was more journalistic than analytical, as he ranged across topics and over decades with 
astonishing breadth but far less depth. See Granvil le Hicks, The PM Mind, New Republic, 
Apr. 16, 1945, at 514, 516 (reviewing Max Lerner, Public Journal :  Marginal Notes on War­
time America (1945)) (" [Lerner] does not speak freely [about troublesome issues] and, 
what is more, he does not probe deeply."). A defini tive assessment of Lerner's contribu­
tions would require systematic review of the entire body of his work (Lerner's papers are 
deposited at Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, some 105 cubic feet of material), 
and is beyond the scope of this Commentary. 
10 Max Lerner, The Social Thought of Mr. Justice Brandeis, 41 Yale L.J. 1 (1931). 
11 Max Lerner, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42 Yale L.J. 668 (1933). 
12 Id.  at 668. 
13 ld. 
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eral causes in his youth, Max Lerner was a Russian Jewish immi­
grant, P his career a success story that is no less remarkable for a 
trajectory that was shared with other Jews of Eastern European origin 
in the first half of the twentieth century.15 
Lerner's edited collection of Holmes 's  writings, his articles on 
Holmes and Brandeis in the Nation and the New Republic, as well as 
in law journals, swelled the tide of popular support for the two Jus­
tices.16 Holmes and Brandeis, thanks in part to Lerner, b ecame cul­
tural icons of no mean order. So revered,  so powerful, so  lasting is the 
image of the two aged men of the law that threescore years after their 
deaths, legal scholars remain preoccupied with their jurisprudence, 
their public and private lives,  and their continuing influence on Amer­
ican legal ideology. How (and why) did two long-lived Jus tices be­
come heroes to a generation of upstarts like Lerner? 
II 
LIBERALISM AND THE MANIPULATION OF THE pAST 
The phenomenal success of the publicity campaign ( "canoniza­
tion," Professor White calls it) was deeply, problematically related to 
New Deal liberalism and the constitutional revolution that trans­
formed legal thought and federal power and that still governs much of 
constitutional interpretation today.n It was in the 1930s that the rep-
14 Richard Severo, Max Lerner, Writer, 89, Is Dead; Humanist on Political Barricades, 
N.Y. Times, June 6, 1992, at 11. 
15 On Lerner's career, see general ly George W. Bain, Liberal Teacher: The Writings of 
Max Lerner, 1925-1965 (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota). 
On the role of Jewish immigrants, see generally David A. Hollinger, In the American Prov­
ince: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ideas (1985). Especial ly useful is chap­
ter four: Ethnic Diversity, Cosmopolitanism, and the Emergence of the American Liberal 
Intelligentsia. Id. at 56-73 (examining role cosmopolitan ideal p layed in integration of Jew­
ish people into American intellectualism during first half of twentieth century). 
16 Included among the list of Lerner's works on Holmes and Brandeis are: The Mind 
and Faith of Justice Holmes: His Speeches, Essays, Letters, and Judicial Opinions at vii 
(Max Lerner ed., 1943) [hereinafter Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes) (describing Holmes 
as "one who was perhaps the most complete personality in the history of American 
thought"); Lerner, supra note 6, at 109 (applying to Holmes the Justice's own epigram: "A 
great man represents a great ganglion in  the  nerves of  society"); Lerner, supra note  10, at  1 
(complimenting Brandeis's understanding in his opinions of realities of social change and 
vested interests and ideas); Max Lerner, Homage to Brandeis, Nation, Feb. 25, 1939, at  222 
[hereinafter Lerner, Homage to Brandeis) (praising pragmatism and activism of Brandeis's 
jurisprudence); Max Lerner, Justice Holmes: Flowering and Defeat, Nation, June 10, 1936, 
at 746 (mourning movement of Supreme Court away from preindustrial aristocratic tradi­
tion represented by Holmes); cf. Brandeis at  Eighty, Nation, Nov. 14, 1936, at  565 (un­
signed editorial) (defending continued intellectual vitality of Justice Brandeis). 
17 On the revolution in constitutional doctrine during the first half of the twentieth 
century, see generally Howard Gil lman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise 
of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence (1993). 
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utations of Holmes and B randeis were forged.  Lerner was a passion­
ate defender of the New Deal, and of the fashioning of a judicial 
tradition compatible with substantial (although by no means radically 
redistributive) economic intervention.18 He and other commentators 
argued (sometimes misleadingly) that the great constitutional ques­
tions of the day-the validity of congressional economic oversight and 
the corresponding duty of the federal judiciary to respect the demo­
cratic restructuring of the national economy in the interest of greater 
economic equality-had been addressed and analyzed by the two wise 
old men of the Supreme Court. 
Although there have been peaks and valleys in the relative 
amounts of attention paid to the two titans, the impression of their 
importance to American jurisprudence created in the 1 930s has re­
mained constant in succeeding decades. B randeis was tarnished only 
slightly by the revelation that he had paid Frankfurter to lobby for 
political causes;19 the revelation in 1985 of Holmes's mid-life love af­
fair20 has only added to his stature in the late twentieth century,21 
when marital fidelity is hardly demanded of heroes. 
The phenomenon has not escaped scholarly notice, as its lifespan 
lengthens and its reverberations expand.22 Professor White himself 
made a foray into the field some time ago, with an article on the " rise 
18 On the abandonment by proponents of the New Deal of wide-ranging redistribution, 
see generally Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and 
War (1995). 
19 See Bruce A. Murphy, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political 
Activities of Two Supreme Court Justices 40-45 (1982) (assessing effect of financial ar­
rangement between Brandeis and Frankfurter on Brandeis's reputation). For a probing 
and elegant new analysis of Brandeis's career as a lawyer, see Clyde Spil lenger, Elusive 
Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as Lawyer and Reformer, 105 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 
1996) (suggesting Brandeis's detachment and independence eroded his abi l i ty to interact 
productively with his own clients). 
20 John Monagan, The Love Letters of Justice Holmes, Boston Globe, Mar. 24, 1985, 
Magazine, at 15 (publishing for first time excerpts of Holmes's love letters to Lady Clare 
Castletown); see also White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, supra note 5, at 230-50 (using 
Holmes-Castletown correspondence to trace relationship). 
21 See G. Edward White, Holmes's "Life P lan": Confronting Ambition, Passion, and 
Powerlessness, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1409, 1442 (1990) (interpreting Holmes-Castletown rela­
tionship as part of Holmes's "conscious attempt to experience passion and feeling with a 
woman on terms compatible with the rest of his l ife plan"). 
22 See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Introduction: Holmes's Shadows, in The Legacy of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 1 ,  4 (Robert W. Gordon ed. ,  1992) (describing this collection of 
essays as "part of an astonishing general revival of interest in Holmes and his ideas"). On 
Brandeis, see, e.g. , Clyde Spillenger, Reading the Judicial Canon: Alexander Bickel and 
the Book of Brandeis, 79 J. Am. Hist. 125, 150 (1992) (noting Bickel's "passionate but vain 
quest for the 'real Brandeis' "). 
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and fall" of Justice Holmes.23 Since the appearance of that article, 
"\Nhite has done extensive work on the period, including a recent biog­
raphy of Holmes and several articles on law and lawyers in the New 
Dea1.2d 
In his work on the New D eal, White has used the term "modern­
ism" to describe the legal philosophy of liberal proponents of an ac­
tivist federal state .25 He has now expanded the concept to include the 
jurisprudence of Holmes and Brandeis .  According to White, both 
Holmes and Brandeis were themselves " epistemological modernis ts," 
by which he means they "believed that humans were the principal ar­
chitects of the universe,"26 and are inherently rational beings, capable 
of ascertaining the truth through objective, scientific inquiry. The pro­
cess of intellectual reorientation to modernism, White argues, 
stretched back " at least to the Enlightenment"27 and presumably con­
tinues relatively unabated in the late twentieth century.28 
Against this backdrop of modernism, White interprets the efflo­
res cence of the reputations of Holmes and Brandeis in the 1930s .  
Even i f  those, like Lerner, who were most effusive i n  their praise sig­
nificantly misunderstood (or distorted-White is not precisely clear)  
the jurisprudence of  the twentieth century's two most  famous 
Supreme Court Justices, White argues, they were correct at a m ore 
fundamental, epistemological level. For i t  was "modernism" writ 
large, rather than a particular jurisprudence, that captivated the New 
D eal generation, and modernism that allows us to "recaptur e" them, 
pigeonholing them firmly and comfortably.29 
Yet epistemological modernists also manipulated the v ery mod­
ernist judicial philosophy that excited their interest in the first place, 
23 G. Edward White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. Chi.  L. Rev. 51 (1971 ) 
(tracing changing image of Holmes in eyes of American intel lectuals). The "fall , "  of 
course, turned out to be more of a blip. 
24 White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, supra note 5 (biography); G. Edward White, 
Looking at Holmes in the Mirror, 4 L. & Hist. Rev. 439, 440-41 (1986) [hereinafter White, 
Looking at Holmes]; G. Edward White, Recapturing New Deal Lawyers, 1 02 H arv. L. Rev.  
489, 489 (1988) [hereinafter White, Recapturing New Deal  Lawyers]; G.  Edward White, 
Revisiting the New Deal Legal Generation, 17  Cap. U .  L. Rev. 37, 39 (1989) (hereinafter 
White, Revisiting the New Deal] .  
25 See, e.g., White, Intervention and Detachment, supra note 5, a t  3, 7 (arguing that 
New Deal figures were first generation to display "fully developed modernist sensibility"); 
White, Recapturing New Deal Lawyers, supra note 24, at 51 0-20 (describing modernist 
ideology of New Deal lawyers). 
26 White, supra note 4, at 580. 
27 Id. 
28 The continuing force of modernism, according to White, has been shaken, but  by no 
means destroyed, by  "postmodernism, "  which i s  as yet  only "nascent. " White, Recapturing 
New Deal Lawyers, supra note 24, at 520-21 ;  see also infra text accompanying notes 71 -72. 
29 See Introduction to White, supra note 4. 
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vVhite argues, exaggerating its potential and mythologizing its pur­
ported progenitors . What we are left wi th is an agglomeration of com­
pounded and confused contortions of both Holmesian and 
Brandeisian thought, as subsequent generations of modernists have 
appropriated whatever they thought most useful for the moment, 
turning the dour and unsympathetic Holmes into a civil libertari an30 
and the state policy-focused Brandeis into a supporter of massive fed­
eral regulation.31 
White has given us a neat package, one that is satisfying at many 
levels: there is irony; there is gossip; there is a unifying theme. Yet 
can anything as vague and undifferentiated as this brand of " modern­
ism" p ossibly explain an entire generation of liberal lawyers and legal 
thought (not to mention the jurisprudence of Holmes and B randeis)? 
Did the created reputations, the visions of what Holmes and B randeis 
meant for law and society, j ust  "fit in" to a prepackaged modernism, 
or did they elbow other visions out? Was modernism's only competi­
tor an exhausted and empty formalism, a vestigial survivor of the late 
nineteenth century? Was everyone who could validly be called an "in­
tellectual" a believer in this brand of epistemology by 1930? And who 
was the "intellectual elite" that adopted and reconfigured Holmes and 
Brandeis when they recognized their modernism? 
The work of Max Lerner allows us to examine White's epistemo­
logical modernism, on the ground as it were. Lerner was a product of, 
and a participant in, a self-consciously ambitious and aggressive effort 
to redefine and redirect American law and politics. 32 His embrace of 
" militant democracy" was deeply influenced by Thorstein Veblen, 
Charles Beard, Walton H amilton, Sigmund Freud, Morris Cohen, and 
Vernon Parrington, just to name a few of the thinkers and activists 
whose work helped transform the understanding of what i t  meant to 
30 See especially, White, Looking at Holmes, supra note 24, at 461-62 (noting that many 
commentators wrongly made Holmes into a l iberal and humanitarian). Lerner was aware 
of the charge that he and other acolytes had overglorified their hero's libertarianism. He 
denied this with some truculence, claiming that he had always been aware that a "tooth­
and-fangs social Darwinism " was ever-present in the Holmesian universe. Lerner, supra 
note 6, at 109. It was judicial restraint, Lerner claimed, that real ly appealed to him. Id. 
On Holmes's eugenist leanings, see generally Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as 
a Eugenic Reformer: Rhetoric in the Writing of Constitutional Law, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 833 
(1986) (discussing Holmes's use of eugenically charged language to express ideology). 
31 See White, supra note 4, at 602. 
32 As Alan Brinkley put it recently, one of the most successful maneuvers executed by 
supporters of the New Deal was the redefinition of l iberalism, away from its nineteenth­
century roots in antistatism. Conservatives in the 1930s, including Herbert Hoover and 
Friedrich Hayek, countered that true liberalism rested on economic freedom, not s tate 
intervention. Alan Brinkley, The Problem of American Conservatism, 99 Am. Hist. Rev. 
409, 416 (1994) (citing Herbert Hoover, The Challenge to Liberty (1934)); Friedrich 
Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 13 (1944). 
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be "liberal." The historical literature of the period is voluminous and 
often contentious.33 How does a jurisprudential "modernism" that 
was orthodox, even as the majority of the Supreme Court rejected it, 
fit in to the canonization of Holmes and Brandeis? 
There was nothing inevitable, I would argue,  about the " triumph" 
of what Lerner often referred to as liberal democracy, and the " elite" 
was at least in part the result of, rather than the cause of, the success­
ful creation of the legends of Holmes and Brandeis. Lerner used the 
language of combat in his articles because a battle was what he under­
stood the campaign to validate the New Deal to be.  Holmes and 
Brandeis , in this view, were " canonized," not because their world view 
was "orthodox, "  but because they were cannons-effective weapons 
against enemy fortifications. 
It  was in the liberal press-the New Republic and the Nation, for 
instance-and a few law journals Uournals with "radical" s tudent edi­
tors , among whom Abe Fortas of the Yale Law Journal was p erhaps 
the most important) that Max Lerner and his confreres conducted 
their "militant" campaign and created a usable judicial past through 
the valorization of Holmes and B randeis .34 
There were good reasons for Jewish liberals (including Jerome 
Frank, Harold Laski, Morris Cohen, and most influential of all , Felix 
Frankfurter, in addition to Lerner) to turn to the press in the 1 930s to 
conduct their campaign, and good reasons for choosing Holmes and 
Brandeis as their icons.  Not only were the i deas that Lerner and this 
group espoused far from orthodox in the 1930s (however dated they 
sound in the 1990s) ,  but these commentators '  status as immigrants­
and above all their ethnicity-marked them as outside the elite. B y  
transforming Holmes and Brandeis into titans, Lerner (who later 
33 See generally Brinkley, supra note 1 8; Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, 
Father Coughlin, and the Beat Depression (1982); Alan Dawley, Struggles for Justice: So­
cia l  Responsibility and the Liberal State (1991); El l is Hawley, The Great War and the 
Search for a Modern Order: A History of the American People and Their Institutions 
1917-1933 (1 979); Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR (1955); 
T.J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of Ameri­
can Culture, 1880-1 920 (1981); Edward A.  Purcel l ,  The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Sci­
entific Naturalism and the Problem of Value (1973); Daniel T. Rodgers, The Work Ethic in 
Industrial America, 1 850-1920 (1978); Jordan A. Schwartz, The New Dealers: Power Poli­
tics in the Age of Roosevelt (1993); Morton G. White ,  Social Thought: The Revolt Against 
Formalism (1949); Gary Gerstle, The Protean Character of American Liberalism, 99 Am. 
Hist. Rev. 1043 (1994); Rodgers, supra note 8. 
34 As Lerner put it: 
I was happy to have two emplacements from which to engage the enemy. One 
was the law journals, run by young militant student editors whom I knew at 
Yale, Harvard, Col umbia, and the University of Pennsylvania. The other was 
my new post as political editor of the Nation , from 1 936 to 1 938. 
Lerner, Preface, supra note 9, at 4. 
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called himself an "unchartered member" of both the liberal New Deal 
and legal realist schools35) played an integral part in the transforma­
tion of American public legal culture along the liberal lines he found 
so congeniaP6 But this was a bootstrap operation; Lerner struggled 
to expand and reconfigure constitutional culture just enough to in­
clude himself and those like him.J7 
III 
THE SciENCE OF CLASS CoNFucr: MAx LERNER ON HoLMES, 
BRANDEIS, AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Clearly, therefore, we need something more specific, more 
timebound than an intellectual tradition of humanism that stretches 
all the way from the Enlightenment to an undefined moment to help 
us situate the politics of judicial interpretation in the New D eal .  One 
way to contextualize political theory in the 1930s is to highlight its 
gradual embrace of a fragm ented polis, the recognition that behind 
high-flown words and ideals lurked stark realities of big business, class 
division, and capitalist m anipulation of politics-that interest groups 
with irreconcilable and aggressive ambitions eroded the possibility of 
a common ground, however lofty the abstraction. Such a theory pro­
vided a significant opportunity for immigrants, even those of non­
Western European origin.38 
As Max Lerner put it, " [t]he philosophy is that individual rights 
and group claims are neither absolute nor unchanging and must be 
weighed in terms of the need for checking and democratizing our cor­
porate capitalism. "39 And the task of the j udge was to grapple with 
change and determine whether legislatures had "reasonably weighed 
conflicting social values. "40 Above all, competition, diverse and diver-
35 Max Lerner, Epilogue to Nine Scorpions in a Bottle,  supra note 6, at 293, 298. 
36 See David A. Hollinger, The "Tough-Minded " Justice Holmes, Jewish Intel lectuals, 
and the Making of an American Icon, in The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., supra 
note 22, at 21 6, 224-25 (discussing Holmes's skepticism and lack of anti-Semitism as key 
elements in creation of Jewish intelligentsia in United States). 
37 For an account of the significant political, ideological, and economic opposition to 
the New Deal, and the modification of the liberal agenda in response, see Alan Brinkley, 
The New Deal and the Idea of the State, in The Rise and Fall  of the New Deal Order, 
1 930-1980, at 85 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989); see also Barry D. Karl, The 
Uneasy State: The United States from 1 915  to 1945 (1983). 
38 For the distinct limitations on the window of opportunity, see infra text accompany­
ing notes 82-87. 
39 Max Lerner, Justice Louis D. Brandeis and Judicial Activism, in Nine Scorpions in a 
Bottle, supra note 6, at 132, 1 33. 
40 Id. at 142. 
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gent classes, and change were vital to the maintenance of democracy, 
Lerner argued.4l 
There was more than a little scientism mixed in with this celebra­
tion of class conflict and competition. In a world plagued by class 
division and exploitation, social scientists argued forcefully that exper­
tise was essential to the informed and rational judgment necessary to 
revitalize democracy.42 As editor of the Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, Lerner was a widely read devotee of political science, psy­
chology, anthropology, economics, sociology, and so on. H e  believed 
deeply in scientific empiricism, including scientific analysis (and ma­
nipulation) of emotions, the popular wil l ,  and economic relations .43 
The idea that a multiplicity of economic interests could in fact be 
a good thing for democracy was in place, as one scholar put it, " [ w Jell 
before the encounter with the terrifyingly grandiloquent rhetoric of 
fascism in the late 1930s. "44 The notion that The Federalist No. 10 ,45 
obscure before its rediscovery and celebration in the 1910s,46 might 
have been right that factions were not necessarily evil paved the way 
for a fundamental retooling of political thought. By the second dec­
ade of the century, historian Charles Beard could paint American con­
stitutional history as a struggle between interests-a b attle for 
supremacy and for access to power, to political office, and above all, 
41 Id. at 144-47. 
42 On the fracturing of abstract theory and the understanding that interest groups made 
political unity a functional impossibility, see Rodgers, supra note 8, at 1 14-17 (discussing 
emergence of pluralistic reading of progressive politics). For an analysis of the response of 
social scientists to the social and intellectual disintegration they perceived in the early 
twentieth century, see Purcell ,  supra note 33, at 15 (noting development of formal social 
sciences in America); Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science 1 43-71 (1 991) 
(describing social scientists' reactions to social discord at turn of century). For analysis of 
legal thought, see generally Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 
1 870-1 960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (1 992) (discussing Progressive ideological chal­
lenges to classical legal thought and idea of rational and objective rules of law). 
43 On the embrace of the language of "scientific reasoning" by both right and left in the 
early twentieth century, see Ross, supra note 42, at 1 54-57. For different interpretations of 
H olmes's scientism, see Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 
787, 789, 789-93 (1989) ("[T)he new philosophical interpretation of pragmatism stresse[d)  
certain ways in which i t  depart[ed] from and indeed undermine[d) orthodox scientific em­
piricism . . . .  "); Holl inger, supra note 36, at 21 6-17 ("Commentators on Holmes have de­
scribed his 'scientific' proclivities as 'Darwinist,' 'positivist,' 'pragmatist,' 'skeptical,' 
'historicist , '  'empiricist,' and 'naturalist.' None of these characterizations are mistaken. "). 
44 Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics Since Inde­
pendence 178 (1987); see also Purcel l ,  supra note 33, at 77-94 (discussing shared intel lec­
tual agenda and chronological parallels between professionalization of legal academics and 
social scientists in first three decades of twentieth century). 
45 The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison). 
46 On the overlap of the new economism and the embrace of faction, see generally Paul 
F. Bourke, The Pluralist Reading of James Madison's Tenth Federalist, in Perspectives in 
American History 271 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds. ,  1975). 
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to money.47 It was B eard, of course, who gave us our first openly 
"economic interpretation of the Constitution. "48 Beard was contro­
versial to say the least-the fact that his focus on economic analysis 
has finally become so mainstream as to be almost unquestioned 
among politicians and lawyers, should not obscure the fact that his 
celebration of class interests was contested at every turn and that key 
in the ultimate acceptance of this peculiarly economic brand of scien­
tific utilitarianism was the very canonization of H olmes and 
Brandeis.49 
For the deeply contested significance (even the presence) of " in­
terests " or "realism" or "class conflict" was at base a debate about 
economic determinism.50 Progressive rhetoric, on the other hand, still 
very much alive in the 1 910s and early 1 920s, gave not an inch to inter­
ests . D rawing instead on the unity-the community-of Protestant­
ism, muckraking journalists revealed the excesses of interests , held up 
the excrescences for all to see and condemn.51 " Individualistic indus­
trialism, "  charged Teddy Roosevelt, was contrary to the common 
good ,  contrary to the moral unity that made America great.S2 
Yet B eard and the first Roosevelt shared a belief in the impor­
tance of empirical research. Investigation, accumulation, and pub lica­
tion of facts powered reform politics. Here the famous B randeis 
brief53 is  a handy illustration of the contingent value of facts-socio-
47 Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United 
States 152-88 (1913). 
48 Id. 
49 For a description of both early optimism that objective research in the social  sciences 
would solve social problems and the ensuing attempt to tie the relativism implied by this 
brand of social science to idealistic values, see Purcell, supra note 33, at 31-46, 139-58. 
50 See, e.g., Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (1957) 
(describing evolution of policies directed toward democratic reform of capitalist economy). 
51 Rodgers, supra note 44, at 176-211, has an especially useful chapter on the role of 
"interests " in political and legal debate from the turn of the twentieth century through the 
New Deal. The fol lowing discussion of interests and the theory of class in Lerner's work 
draws on Rodgers's analysis of political rhetoric. 
52 Rodgers, supra note 44, at 182 (quoting John A. Gable, The Bul l  Moose Years: 
Theodore Roosevel t  and the Progressive Party 125 (1978)); see also Ross, supra note 42, at 
143-62 (arguing that social scientists revised their disciplines away from ideological po­
larizations of socialism and thereby laid groundwork for twentieth-century social science). 
For an edited collection of progressive writings, see Christopher Lasch, The New Radical­
ism in America, (1889-1963): The Intellectual as a Social Type (1965). 
53 Brief for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107). 
Packed with the results of numerous studies of long work hours on the health and ferti l i ty 
of women, see id. at 36-42, the brief is an exemplar of the use of social science data to good 
legal effect. It has also become notorious among women's groups as the kind of "protec­
tive" argument that serves as much to justify discrimination as protection. See, e.g., Nancy 
S. Erikson, Muller v. Oregon Reconsidered: The Origins of a Sex-Based Doctrine of Lib­
erty of Contract, 30 Lab. Hist. 228, 228-29 (1989) (setting forth view that "[t)he Brandeis 
brief is supposed to have persuaded the Court in two ways; it . . .  contained scientific and 
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logical evidence, rather than verbal abstraction, could be turned to a 
variety of uses, including establishing the contours of the " public 
good" broadly defined in Progressive language, or in the scientific "in­
terest" of the new realpolitik. In either case, this was an era, like our 
own, that valorized the "expert ,"  the gatherer and organizer of social 
fact, especially when culled by scientists, and harnessed to public de­
bate by politicians, lawyers, and other wordsmiths.54 
This empiricism had already been at work for decades in the post­
Civil War bureaucracies, in the massive reports on labor, and mar­
riage, in the census, and in statistics generally.55 Sociology even in­
vaded legal thought in the work of Roscoe Pound;56 but it  was in 
pragmatism, in the work first of William James and then of John 
D ewey, that empiricism morphed into a powerful political force .57 
Empiricists, among whom must be counted Lerner and other liberals 
of the 1930s, aimed to retool government, to disable legislation and 
legal theory based on abstract principles, and to replace theory with 
sociological materials rather than just dry legal precedent and . . .  convinced the Court that 
the differences between men and women would justify a difference in legal treatment" but 
arguing that brief did not determine outcome in Muller). 
54 Rodgers, supra note 44, at 1 93; see also Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny: 
A History of Modern American Reform 250-68 (1977) (describing upsurge of positions in 
New Deal administrations for planners, economists, and reformers to pursue rational plan­
ning through empiricism); Horwitz, supra note 42, at 169-246 (defining concept of legal 
realism); Purcel l ,  supra note 33, at 1 59-79 (describing crisis in jurisprudence created by 
conflict between scientific naturalism and traditional legal theory); John H. Schlegel ,  
American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science 1 -13 (1995) (outlining use of empiri­
cal legal research by scholars, lawyers, and judges). Especial ly insightful in its analysis of 
one intel lectual's efforts to tackle these and related questions in the realm of jurisprudence, 
as well as evidence that Holmes's ideas were fodder for intel lectual debate well before the 
1 930s, is David A. Holl inger, Morris R. Cohen and the Scientific Ideal 165-99 (1975). 
55 Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science 44 (1977) 
(describing emergence of factual inquiry to describe causation of social phenomena); 
Wil l iam E. Nelson, The Roots of American Bureaucracy, 1 830-1900, at 82-112  (1 982) 
(describing late-nineteenth-century reformers' use of scientific methodology, classification, 
and data in their reform efforts and development of extensive American bureaucracies to 
support those efforts). 
56 Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt. 3), 25 
Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1912) (arguing that there is sociological jurisprudence in law rooted in 
positivist philosophy and outlining its historical development). 
57 On pragmatism generally, see Philip P. Wiener, Evolution and the Founders of Prag­
matism (1949) (studying genesis of several broad philosophical doctrines loosely  compris­
ing American pragmatism). For pragmatism in legal thought, see Robert W. Gordon, 
Holmes' Common Law as Legal and Social Science, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 719, 722-23 (1 982) 
(challenging pragmatism as basis for understanding Holmes's The Common Law and sug­
gesting instead scientific positivism relying on empirical conditions); Grey, supra note 43, 
at 793-805 (distinguishing American pragmatism from scientific empiricism). 
.·• 
\, 
I 
I 
r 
I 
� 
r 
" 
June 1 995] BIO G RA PHIES OF TITANS 635 
evidence, stat1st1cs , and expert testimony. Borrowing a term from 
Holmes , Lerner frequently called such scientism "tough-minded. "SS 
This was no comfortable and seamless evolution, however, as 
Lerner's soldier mentality attests. His " militant democracy" of fact 
was a challenge to idealism at the most fundamental level, an (often 
unconscious, or at least uncomfortable) embrace of moral relativism 
that was in the deepest sense a rebellion against generality in favor of 
the particular.59 Scientific reasoning, of course,  could be every bit as 
formalistic as the natural law/substantive due process model it  eventu­
ally elbowed out.6o 
E conomic interest analysis quickly spread beyond the confines of 
politics traditionally defined. By the 1920s, advertising, consumerism, 
and above all  the realization that propaganda, far more than any ab­
stract unity, shaped public desires and predilections further eroded 
faith in any single public will or public good.61 The "marketplace of 
ideas"62 was a noisy, competitive, interest-group laden arena, where 
lobbyists, pressure-groups, and reformers vied for air time. Manipula­
tion of preferences (rather than articulation of values) produced im-
58 The phrase " tough-minded" was coined by William James in 1907. See William 
James, Pragmatism 13 (Harvard Univ. Press 1975) (1907) ( l isting characteristics of "tender­
minded" and " tough-minded" people). Holmes applied the epithet to himself in corre­
spondence with James. Ralph B. Perry, The Thought and Character of William James 301 
(Harvard Univ. Press, briefer version 1948) (1935) (" 'I am more sceptical than you are. 
You would say that I am too hard or tough-minded,-! think none of the philosophers 
sufficiently humble."') (quoting Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Wil l iam James (Oct. 13, 
1907)); cf. Holl inger, supra note 36, at 2 16 (discussing Holmes's "scientific way of looking 
at the world"). For one of many examples of Lerner's attraction to the term, see, e .g. ,  Max 
Lerner, The Personnel of the Supreme Court: Some Recent Literature, 2 Nat'! Law. Guild 
Q. 9, 13 (1939) (criticizing Kenneth B. Umbreit, Our Eleven Chief Justices: A History of 
the Supreme Court in Terms of the Personalities (1938) for a " lack of tough-mindedness" 
for failing to incorporate all available historical data into this discussion). 
59 Rodgers, supra note 44, at 193. On the moral relativism incipient in the jurispru­
dence of the early twentieth century, see Heidi M. Hurd, Relativistic Jurisprudence: Skep­
ticism Founded on Confusion, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1417, 1427-37 (1988) (discussing Holmes's 
rejection of moral absolutism). For relativism in scholarly legal commentary, see Purce l l ,  
supra note 33, at 74-94 (discussing legal realism during first four decades of twentieth 
century). 
60 I am not the first to notice the irony. See Ross, supra note 42, at 183-86 (noting that 
proponents of economics sometimes asserted that their conclusions were absolute and ad­
vocated naturalism). 
61 See, e.g., Edward L. Bernays, Propaganda 150 (1928) (describing modern propa­
ganda as necessary tool in democratic society for structuring p ublic relations and debate); 
Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public 112-13 (1925) (illustrating power of propaganda as 
tool by which private interests sought to manipulate disinterested public); Frederick E. 
Lumley, The Propaganda Menace 45 (1933) (describing propaganda as major, continuous, 
omnipresent, implacable activity in American society). 
62 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(" (T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi­
tion of the market."). 
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mediate payoffs, a new reality reflected in the theories that law is 
made (not found) by judges and that politics consists of coalition­
building, rather than direct appeal to a unified people.63 
The most powerful confirmation of the theory that the m achine 
of capitalism had created a multiplicity of economic (and thus p olit­
ical) interests, of course, came with the Great Depression . The second 
Roosevelt's administration flowed into pragmatic consequentialism, 
stressing empirical fact, class conflict, the inseparability of l aw and 
politics, and, by no means least, economics.64 The conservative oppo­
sition made hay out of New Dealers ' abandonment of moral abso­
lutes, appealing to the shades of the Framers, the D eclaration of 
Independence, and the Constitution itself.65 They turned to the 
courts, where abstractions and bright lines had long been welcome.  
They came very, very close indeed to victory, as  the Supreme Court 
cloaked itself in powerful constitutional metaphors, refusing to cater 
to the clamor of interests .66 
IV 
PROPAGANDA, SYMBOLISM, AND A USABLE PAST 
Even after victory in 1 937,67 good New Dealers acted on the les­
sons that they had internalized in the first two decades of the twenti-
63 Purcell, supra note 33, at 74-94 (discussing rise of "legal realism" and corresponding 
decline of natural law theory during 1 920s);  Rodgers, supra note 44, at 1 99 (discussing 
development of advertising and corresponding fears of propaganda in post-World War I 
era). 
64 Horwitz, supra note 42, at 1 93; Rodgers, supra note 44, at  203-04; see also Richard H. 
Pells, Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social Thought in the Depres­
sion Years 78-86 ( 1 984) (discussing New Deal's empirically driven approach to social 
reforms). 
65 Hofstadter, supra note 33, at 315 (describing how conservatives used " inspirational 
l i terature of American life" to attack New Dealers' allegedly immoral "experimentation") .  
66 For the most recent analysis of the Supreme Court crisis of 1 937, see generally 
William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in 
the Age of Roosevelt ( 1995). The significance of the 1 937 victory for the New Deal has 
recently been challenged by Alan Brinkley, who argues that active reform had for t he most 
part ceased by the advent of the Court-packing plan. Brinkley, supra note 18, at  17-20. 
67 There are many superb treatments of Roosevelt's Court-packing plan,  and the so­
called "Switch in Time that Saved Nine." See supra note 66. Lerner, who l ike some other 
passionate supporters of the New Deal, wrote editorials in the Nation in support of the 
Court-packing plan, was fired for his apparent abandonment of principle in the interests of 
politics. Lerner, Preface, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing Lerner's support for Roosevelt in 
1937 and noting that " I  lost my Nation editorship as a consequence"). For a recent contro­
versy on the Revolution of 1937, see Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 
1 07 Harv. L. Rev. 620, 641 ( 1994) ("Instead of vindicating Roberts, the timing defense 
suggests (but doesn't prove) the opposite . . . .  "); cf. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 
1 04 U. Pa. L. Rev. 31 1 , 314-1 5 (1 955) (citing memorandum in which Roberts explained that 
he had not acted under pressure created by Court-packing plan when he shifted his vote in 
critical minimum wage cases of 1 936 and 1 937); Richard D.  Friedman, A Reaffirmation: 
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eth century. They recognized that they needed symbols as well as 
statistics, heroes in addition to hearings. Like their opponents, they 
searched for plausible precedents for their present actions. �They ere·· 
ated usable pasts, redacting and refracting history to create a bedrock 
of tradition. Among historians, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. 's Age of 
Jackson exemplifies the New D eal's search for historical roots, to 
quell the voices of opposition by claiming a heritage every bit as 
American as the conservatives could muster.6s 
The recognition that proponents of the New Deal were wedded 
to both economic analysis and empirical research and that they under­
stood the value of clever public relations efforts, especially the need 
for a credible link to tradition, provides useful clues to the " canoniza­
tion" of Holmes and Brandeis. For the judicial revolution of the 
1 930s, as Max Lerner and other supporters recognized, needed legal 
roots to stabilize it in the public 's mind, much less in legal thought. A 
child of the age of propaganda, Lerner understood the value of sym­
bols and heroes that established connections to the present through 
the past. 
Lerner defended what he referred to as the "necessary economic 
and political adj ustments" of industrial capitalism to protect liberal 
democracy.69 He maintained that the economic and j udicial crises of 
the Great Depression were inevitably linked by the fact that the prop­
ertied elite had undermined the integrity of both the economy and the 
judiciary by their greed.7° Yet truly patriotic judges could not be con­
trolled; Holmes and Brandeis became models of what Lerner called 
" the realities of the j udicial power. "71 
Lerner's book, The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes , was in­
tended to demonstrate, as he put it,  that " [t]he constitutional crisis of 
the New D eal . . . cleared the way for the complete adoption of 
The Authenticity of the Roberts Memorandum, or Felix the Non-Forger, 1 42 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1985, 1993 n .36 (1994) (pointing out that timing of events in West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), precluded possibility that Roberts had cast his vote under 
pressure created by Court-packing plan). Thanks to my colleague A. Leo Levin for this 
insight. 
68 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson at ix (1945). As Schlesinger himself 
put it, "history can contribute nothing in the way of panaceas. But it can assist vital ly in 
the formation of that sense of what is democratic, of what is in l ine with our republican 
traditions, which alone can save us." Id. at  x. See also the work of George H. Soule, 
including George H. Soule, The Future of Liberty ( 1934) (arguing that protection of l iberty 
requires reexamination of traditional symbols of American faith). 
69 Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 Yale L.J. 1 290, 1303-04 (1937); 
see also Lerner, supra note 11, at 687 (arguing that Supreme Court power affects nexus 
between law and economic institutions). 
70 Lerner, supra note 69, at 131 7-18. 
71 Id. 
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Holmes 's views on constitutional law. The new doctrinal directions of 
the present Supreme Court spell more than anything else a return to 
Holmes. " 72 And to Brandeis he attributed leadership of the " pha­
lanxes that have brought the economic emphasis into legal thought. "73 
As Lerner put it,  Holmes and Brandeis had "refertilized American 
law" with "pragmatism" and a "hard-headed statistical bent," reinvig­
orating a scientific legal tradition essential to democracy since 
Jefferson. 74 
On any view, this is a creative reading of the place of Holmes and 
Brandeis in American law and history, by a man who was alive to the 
cultural value of being able to claim two Justices for his side of the 
great divide of the late 1 930s. The exceptionalism that sustained such 
an optimistic reinterpretation of Jefferson, let alone Holmes, was 
characteristic both of Lerner75 and of the development of a "satisfying 
interpretation of America itself" of which the construction of the rep­
utations of Holmes and Brandeis was a constituent part.76 Lerner's  
mission, he all  but admitted openly, was to construct a new set  of sym­
bols for the Court, a new pantheon of American heroes with credible 
historical roots . He used the tools of his background in social science 
to elaborate a context for himself and his allies.  Holmes and Brandeis 
were by far the most likely j udicial exemplars of Lerner's liberal phi­
losophy, but the fit  was by no means seamless.  
In an article in the Yale Law Journal in 1 937 entitled " Constitu­
tion and Court as Symbols,"77 Lerner began by noting that H olmes 
understood the power of symbols and that in the twentieth century, 
propaganda was the most effective of political tools-the successful 
72 Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes, supra note 16, at xlix. 
73 Lerner, Homage to Brandeis, supra note 16, at 222. 
74 Id. 
75 So relentless was Lerner's faith in American exceptiona!ism, and in the end so un­
focused and unreflective, that one caustic reviewer accused him of believing in "ectoplas­
mic uplift." Lerner's Flying Carpet, Time, Jan. 6, 1958, at 76, 78 (reviewing Max Lerner, 
America as a Civilization (1957)). Only two years later, another reviewer dismissed 
Lerner, who was in his day a "daring" and dangerous commentator, as "chuckle-headed" 
and "sentimental . "  Phoebe Adams, 205 Atlantic Monthly 120, 120-21 (1960) (reviewing 
Max Lerner, The Unfinished Country: A Book of American Symbols (1959)). One 
scholar remarked recently that Lerner and Oscar Hammerstein shared a "cock-eyed opti­
mism" common to Jewish immigrants of their generation. Conversation with Lawrence 
Fleischer, Professor, City College of New York and Adjunct Professor, New York Univer­
sity (July 10, 1 995). 
76 See Hollinger, supra note 36, at 225 (discussing efforts of Jewish intel lectuals and 
WASP antiparochialists to espouse common cosmopolitan ideal and construct l iberal, em­
blematic culture for America); see also Ross, supra note 42, at 58-59 (noting that crisis in 
American exceptionalism rejected inherited cultural traditions in favor of visible, compre­
hensible, statistic-based reality). 
77 Lerner, supra note 69. 
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manipulation of symbols is an essential technique in the struggle for 
power and meaning.78 " Men possess thoughts , "  Lerner maintained, 
"but symbols possess men. "79 
Fetishism , be it of the Constitution or any other symbol, Lerner 
asserted in language heavy with anthropological and psychological un­
dercurrents, could be a powerful instrument in "cementing internal 
order,"8° especially when both sides understand themselves to claim 
allegiance to the symbol, be it the Constitution in antebellum America 
or the "cult of judicial power," as he put it, in the years since the Civil 
War.s1 But Lerner was sensitive to the possibility that the symbol 
could be perverted,  claimed by those " professional patrioteers [who] 
use the Constitution in a coldly instrumental way for their own pur­
poses. "82 The Court, too, could be captured, as by Taney in the Dred 
Scott decision, when the power that the Court had accreted through 
the Marshall years was revealed in all its raw strength. And, Lerner 
charged, this capture could be accomplished by the "capitalist elite ,"  
that had "used the Supreme Court so long and so blindly for their own 
purposes that they ha[ d] finally succeeded in undermining its strength 
and prestige. "83 
The question then was whether the Court could ever recover its 
place of honor, whether it could be wrested from the stranglehold of 
the narrow and stagnant ruling class.  Would j udges recognize that 
they did not rule as by divine right, that they could not stand " be­
tween the hungry generations and the appeasement of their hunger, 
between Bill Jones and a minimal standard of decency in living? "S4 
Truly great j udges understood this fundamental mandate. Lerner 
could point to B randeis 's  j urisprudence as "checking and democratiz­
ing our corporate capitalism,"85 and Holmes as "a great spokesman 
for our constitutional tradition because he was a great enough con­
servative to enlarge the framework of the p ast to accommodate at 
least some of the needs of the present. "86 B oth understood the reali­
ties of class conflict, the force of economic analysis, the relativism of 
law, and the limits of judges; that is, they were "tough-minded . "  As 
78 Id. at 1292. 
79 Id. at 1293. For a general review of how symbols operate as cultural strategies, see 
Clifford Geertz, Ethos, World View and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols, in The Interpreta­
tion of Cultures 126, 140-41 (1973). 
so Lerner, supra note 69, at 1298. 
81 Id. at 1303. 
82 Id. at 1305. 
SJ Id.  at 1317. 
84 Id. at 1315. 
85 Lerner, Homage to Brandeis, supra note 1 6, at 222. 
86 Lerner, supra note 6, at 125. 
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Lerner saw the world in the late 1 930s and early 1 940s ,  these were 
hallmarks of "liberal," even "militant" democracy. 
CoNcLusroN 
In the late 1 980s and early 1 990s, these same qualities (that is ,  
economic analysis , legal relativism, and judicial limitation) strike a far 
different note87-one that Max Lerner in his old age charged had 
been perverted into a " tenacious cult of property. "88 Those who claim 
to be the intellectual heirs of Holmes and B randeis fight out their 
meaning over the generations, telling us more than whether they are 
resourceful lawyers, more even than what modernism is for legal 
thought in a given century. They point us to the camouflaged weak­
nesses of a given legal philosophy, the places where heroes are needed 
to cover the exposed terrain. 
For liberals in the 1 930s, the embrace of economics was a retreat 
from yawning and complex questions of race, ethnicity, and gender.89 
The racial and nativist violence of the first two decades of the twenti­
eth century, rather than prompting Lerner and other liberals to ad­
dress questions of racial or ethnic equality, instead p rovoked a 
reconfiguration of social science research away from cultural ques­
tions that seemed dogged by "irrationality," and toward s tu dies of 
class division that could be rendered in comforting numerical terms.90 
The politics of class and the rationality of economic science were the 
essence of what was knowable to Lerner and other liberals; and 
knowability in turn defined "rationality," especially for purposes of 
87 Robert Gordon made this point about the contemporary law and economics move-
ment's admiration for Holmes: 
What (the movement] overtly responds to in Holmes is primarily his uti l i tarian 
economism: the conception of law as a risk-allocation mechanism of incentives 
and disincentives rather than as a set of commands or moral precepts; the quasi 
behaviorism in Holmes's insistence that law is a set of "external" standards 
directed to outward behavior; and the programmatic ambition (which Holmes 
himsel f  . . .  did nothing to fulfill) to reconstruct law on a foundation of welfare 
economics, a science of satisfying measurable desires. 
Gordon, supra note 22, at 6. 
88 Severo, supra note 14, at 1 1 . 
89 On the liberal e lision of race and ethnicity in the 1 930s, see generally Gerstle, supra 
note 33, at 1 063-67. On gender, see Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Geneal ogy of De­
pendency : Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 Signs 309 (1994). 
90 Gary Gerstle points to the work of Robert S. Lynd & Helen M. Lynd,  M iddletown: 
A Study in American Culture (1 929), as exemplary of the sanitization of racial and ethnic 
conflict, and a simultaneous embrace of economics as a substitute for other forms of analy­
sis. See Gerstle, supra note 33, at 1 061 (noting that only four pages of Lynds' voluminous 
case study of midwestern industrial town examined activities of active local Ku Klux Klan). 
June 1995] BIOGRA PHIES OF TITA NS 64 1 
political debate and social action.91  Lerner's battle was the creation of 
a new orthodoxy, the reconfiguration of the rationality of law in the 
image of a particular, time-bound understanding of the term. That the 
perceived rational basis of class conflict had sharply eroded by the late 
1 940s , with the celebration of racial and ethnic diversity as the locus of 
healthy difference effectively displacing the focus on class, was just the 
first of many twists and turns that ultimately rendered Max Lerner's 
brand of liberalism obsolete92 and required a reinterpretation of the 
j udicial past-a recrafting of what it  meant to be a "titan. "  
The historiography of judicial biography, the study of the canoni­
zation of Holmes and Brandeis, is the examination of just this kind of 
shifting understanding and the creation of usable pasts . Historians de­
light in this kind of parsing when dealing with the appropriation of 
political ideas and political heroes. We have only j ust begun, as one 
legal historian noted recently, to conduct similarly searching analyses 
of legal ideas and judicial heroes.93 This symposium promises to fur­
ther the enterprise, to quicken our sense that legal words h ave multi­
ple (and even contradictory) meanings over time-that contests over 
the meaning of j udicial titans have a fascinating history, ripe for study. 
91 Psychiatrists and psychologists confirmed and redacted the conviction that irrational­
ity plagued much of the population and could not be checked by reasoned debate. See 
general ly Robert M. Crunden, From Self to Society, 1919-1941 (1972) and especially chap­
ter two on the influence of psychology on intellectual debate. ld. at 29-75. Lerner, of 
course, both exploited the insights of psychology in his embrace of propaganda as a polit­
ical tool, and sharply limited his use of such tools to the advocacy of "rational" reform. 
92 This insight into Lerner's failure to come to grips effectively with the civil rights 
movement, to adjust his liberalism to a changed world, was first noticed, and suggested to 
me, by Lawrence Fleisher. Conversation with Lawrence Fleischer, supra note 75. 
93 For a particularly perceptive analysis of one example of the production of meaning 
through the redaction of Brandeis's jurisprudence, and a call for understanding that " the 
ongoing i nterpretation and reinterpretation of our canonical judicial figures is i tself em­
bedded in political commitments," see Spil lenger, supra note 22, at 150. 
